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Abstract
Background and Objective: Nowadays usage paradigms of medical imaging resources are requesting vendor-neutral archives,
accessible through standard interfaces, with multi-repository support. Regional repositories shared by distinct institutions, tele-
radiology as a service at Cloud, teaching and research archives, are illustrative examples of this new reality. However, traditional
production environments have a server archive instance per functional domain where every registered client application has access
to all studies. This paper proposes an innovator ownership concept and access control mechanisms that provide a multi-repository
environment and integrates well with standard protocols.
Methods: A secure accounting mechanism for medical imaging repositories were designed and instantiated as an extension of a
well-known open-source archive. A new Web services layer was implemented to provide a vendor-neutral solution complaint with
modern DICOM-Web protocols for storage, search and retrieve of medical imaging data.
Results: The concept validation was done through the integration of proposed architecture in an open-source solution. A quanti-
tative assessment was performed for evaluating the impact of the mechanism in the usual DICOM Web operations.
Conclusions: This article proposes a secure accounting architecture able to easily convert a standard medical imaging archive
server in a multi-repository solution. The proposal validation was done through a set of tests that demonstrated its robustness and
usage feasibility in a production environment. The proposed system offers new services, fundamental in a new era of Cloud-based
operations, with acceptable temporal costs.
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1. Introduction
In the last years, digital medical imaging has seen its pres-
ence in healthcare providers ascending, following the evolu-
tionary tendencies in the IT sector. Healthcare institutions have
been constantly increasing the number of services provided for
the patient’s well-being like, for instance, telemedicine or inte-
grated electronic Patient Record (ePR) [1]. Nowadays, remote
reading of medical imaging studies is likely to be one of the
most successful health services [2]. It is characterized by the
transmission of medical images (CT, XA or CR, for instance)
over the network and its further interpretation for diagnostic
purposes.
The communication processes, data format, storage, query-
ing, retrieval, visualization and printing of such medical imag-
ing information are specified by the international Digital Imag-
ing and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) standard [3],
the leading normalization effort in this area [4, 5, 6]. The in-
formation about the patient is agglutinated in one or multiple
standard files containing, besides image pixel data, metadata
related to the patient, study, or report.
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Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) are
systems responsible for the acquisition, storage and distribu-
tion of the medical images [7], alongside with the managing of
the workflow, that deeply rely on DICOM standard. A typical
infrastructure is composed of one or multiple archives, acqui-
sition modalities (data production units), distribution mecha-
nisms and visualization equipment (workstations). In a tradi-
tional production environment, the archive serves a single or-
ganizational domain where the authorized users have access to
all resources within the repository [8]. In these scenarios, ac-
counting mechanisms like Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
mechanisms are not required. Nevertheless, this reality is also
changing since the biggest organizations are being divided into
departments with different areas of activity. Besides, there is
also the need for division of infrastructures, i.e. multiple realms
of data belonging to the same organization.
The exclusivity of inter-institutional processes is also chang-
ing with the creation of regional archives [9, 10] or even out-
sourcing of storage services that runs at Cloud [11, 12, 13]
and serves many users and domains. Healthcare institutions
are continuously investing in better IT infrastructures to support
medical imaging departments, including installation and main-
tenance. Traditional operational business model and methods
are becoming obsolete with the proliferation of reliable cloud
storage services and its adoption by healthcare in detriment of
local infrastructure [14]. The new technological advances are
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opportunities to develop new products and services that change
the way how data is communicated and shared, anytime and
anywhere, at high speed. The main advantages of cloud com-
puting are cost savings, wide availability and high scalability
[15, 16, 17, 18]. Nowadays, we are at an early stage transition
of the medical imaging market to the Cloud.
This article proposes an architecture to support multi-user
and multi-archive paradigm on a standard medical imaging
repository, without interfere in the regular workflows supported
by DICOM. The main goal is to provide resources ownership
mechanisms and protection from unauthorized access. Those
resources may be image objects, management or organizational
services. To accomplish the objectives, it was developed a secu-
rity layer to act directly in DICOM Web services (i.e. WADO-
RS, QIDO-RS and STOW-RS), alongside with a layer and a
web interface to manage the system users, resources and per-
missions. The proposed mechanism was integrated with a pop-
ular open-source archive, i.e. Dicoogle, validating the solution
and demonstrating the advantages of having a multi-archive
with a policy of multi-permission granting in the context of
open medical imaging environments.
2. Background
2.1. DICOM and PACS
DICOM is the de facto standard in the medical imaging area
[6, 19]. It is universally used and supports systems interoper-
ability in the last twenty-five years. It defines a non-proprietary
medical data interchanging protocol, data format, file struc-
ture for medical images and its associated metadata, client and
server services, workflow, among others [20].
The standard tries to model the real-world scenario in health-
care institutions. This is defined in the DICOM Information
Model (DIM) [21] that deals with the structure and organiza-
tion of the information related to the medical image. In this
model, a patient can have one or more studies. Each study can
have multiple series. A series assimilates a modality (or type
of data) and contains one or various DICOM object instances.
DICOM objects contain a wide-range of metadata related not
only to the image itself but also about the acquisition process,
patient or specimen, or even organization. The metadata at-
tributes present in each object is normalized by modality (e.g.
XA, MRI, CT) and includes mandatory, conditional and op-
tional attributes. DICOM objects are organized in Information
Entities that mimics real-world organization.
Concerning the standard network layer, DICOM defines,
since 1993, a set of services (DIMSE services), designated to
handle the storage (C-STORE), query (C-FIND) and retrieve
(C-MOVE) of DICOM objects over TCP/IP. Later, with the ris-
ing popularity of the Web Service technologies, it was created
the DICOM Web version that makes the enumerated DIMSE
services available through the web (i.e. accessible by HTTP).
WADO-RS (Web Access to DICOM Objects by RESTful Ser-
vices) is responsible to make available the access to DICOM
objects like images or reports. It enables the retrieval of a spe-
cific study, series, instance or frames through HTTP. However,
the requester must know the identifier of the resource to ac-
cess it. QIDO-RS (Query based on ID for DICOM Objects by
RESTful Services) enables the searching for studies, series or
instances and their requested attributes. Finally, the STOW-RS
(Store Over the Web by RESTful Services) allows the storage
of DICOM objects in the Web archive server. The prolifera-
tion of DICOM compliant equipment enabled the exchange of
data between medical imaging devices and triggered the im-
plementation of PACS [22]. It contemplates a set of hardware
and software that processes, stores, distributes and provides
medical images or a portion of them in the healthcare institu-
tion [3, 23]. For instance, modalities (digital image acquisi-
tion devices), digital image archives (storage of acquired im-
ages), workstations (devices to view the images) or printers are
components belonging to PACS. The workflow has three major
steps: acquisition, the process of acquiring and encoding the
medical image; distribution, the process of moving the images
and its metadata from the one node to another; visualization,
the process of reviewing the images, typically in a workstation.
2.2. Dicoogle
Dicoogle is a popular open-source PACS [24] that has a mod-
ular architecture and uses a document-based indexing system as
database [23]. Its plugin concept and the provision of a software
development kit (SDK), encourage developers and researchers
to quickly develop a new functionality (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Dicoogle general architecture. Adapted from [25].
As expressed, the platform replaces the traditional relational
database with a more agile process of indexing and retrieval
mechanism [25]. The solution was designed to extract, index
and store all the metadata presented in DICOM files of receipt
studies, including private tags, without any engineering or con-
figuration process [24, 26]. Taking advantage of the modular
architecture, Dicoogle can be used to support three distinct us-
age scenarios: production, research and teaching. Dicoogle
SDK was created in order to simplify the development of new
features [24] by third parties while still assuring compatibility
with the core functionalities. To expand Dicoogle with a new
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functional module, developers are required to implement the
available interfaces and move the built package to the plugins
directory. After this process, Dicoogle will automatically load
the new modules on startup. Dicoogle SDK makes immediately
available all operations related to storage, querying and index-
ation via its internal API [25].
Dicoogle plugin may be of 5 categories: storage, index,
query, web service and web user interface. Storage plugins are
responsible for handling the store and retrieval of DICOM data.
The implementation of this type of plugin would either keep the
files in a local filesystem or in a remote storage. Index plugins
handle the indexation of the metadata extracted from the DI-
COM objects archived. The indexation of the files allows the
quick search and retrieval and it is closely interconnected with
another type of plugins, the query plugins. As the name says,
query plugins allow to query the indexed data. Usually, the
query provider is coupled with a particular indexer and even
bundled in the same plugin set. It is also possible to extend the
web services present in Dicoogle, developing the Web Service
plugin. Besides the extension of new services, developers may
also implement new UI (User Interface) components that are
automatically loaded into Dicoogle’s web application, the Web
User Interface plugins.
2.3. IHE
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) is an initia-
tive that promotes a standard-based approach for developing
universal-accepted solutions and, thus, providing interoperabil-
ity [27, 28]. IHE defines the entities “actors” and “transactions”
[28]. Actors are systems or parts that, in the current scenario,
interact and share data in a process called Transactions [28, 29].
XDS (Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing) enables the shar-
ing of patient information. This is a document-centric architec-
ture that allows query and retrieve specific data for a specific
patient [30]. XDS model incorporates and central registry that
store metadata relative to the published document.
IHE introduced XDS-I.b (Cross-Enterprise Document Shar-
ing for Imaging) [27]. The published profile addresses a so-
lution for sharing documents across multiple institutions [30].
The payload of those documents may encompass imaging stud-
ies, including acquired images, diagnostic reports or a selection
of relevant images related with the report requested [27, 30].
The system that will share documents needs to create a mani-
fest containing relevant data as references for the medical image
and publish it on the central repository [31]. Nonetheless, an ac-
tor that wants to retrieve prior available images, starts by query-
ing the central registry and retrieving the manifest [30, 31].
Once the manifest contains the detailed reference for the ob-
jects as Study, Series and Instance UIDs, the consumer starts a
Transaction using DICOM C-Move or DICOM WADO [30].
2.4. Access Control in Healthcare Information Systems
The literature reports some works regarding privacy and se-
curity in medical repositories and healthcare environments. In
fact, many authors [32, 33, 34, 35] find the usage of access con-
trol and essential tool in healthcare. Fabian et al. [35] assert
that inter-organizational sharing and collaborative use of medi-
cal data has becoming very important. The authors propose in
the same paper an architecture and implementation of a mech-
anism to securely share healthcare patient data.
In [2], the author presents and discusses principles and re-
quirements already developed for electronic health records, fo-
cusing after on privacy protection requirements, controls and
security services including accountability. Among other re-
quirements, it highlights that systems must certify that data is
not disclosed or accessed by unauthorized users during the ses-
sion(s). It is recommended that employees inside the health-
care institution should be under access control services, ensur-
ing that no unauthorized agent have access to data.
In [36], the authors empathize the importance of the mod-
ernization of the healthcare system. However, with the devel-
opment in this area, some challenges come across regarding
security, safety and privacy of patient’s records. The authors
question how to provide a secure way of sharing medical data.
The solution is assured by access control, which verifies the
person’s access permission in order to ensure security.
Ma, W. et al. [8] focus on the nowadays issue that everyone
that logon the workstation in the lab can access every study
of every patient. The author also warns that once the client
application entity (IP, port and AETitle) are added to the PACS
whitelist, any user logged on as a client application has access
to all images stored in the archive. Later on, the same authors
[37] propose a security middleware infrastructure. The main
objective was to develop an infrastructure that provides online
security mechanism such as authentication and authorization,
audit logs and dynamic setting of access rights by authorizing
user’s behavior.
According to [34], most recent access control systems are
very inflexible when using role-based access control schemes.
In [38], Seol, K. et al propose an attribute-based access con-
trol model that can be flexible when comparing to the existing
RBAC schemes.
Mashima and Ahamad [39] proposed an architecture to con-
trol the access of the patients to the health information. Their
mechanisms focus on when and how the information can be
accessed. In [40], authors combined RBAC with Flexible Au-
thorization Framework (FAF) to specify access control policies,
a framework where authorizations are specified in terms of a hi-
erarchic rule-based logic.
More recently, in [33], the authors propose Cerberus, an ac-
cess control scheme to enforce access to Cohort Study Plat-
forms (CSP). It ensures the full stack of the access right man-
agement using ontologies and flexible access control.
In [41], the authors stand that security is a essential issue in
telemedicine. However, in spite of the existing solutions from
nowadays, there is a lack of an access control mechanism pre-
pared to deal with the DICOM information model and objects
integrated in a PACS environment.
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3. Methods
3.1. Access Control Model
The proposed system implements a role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) model. Its definition started with the analysis of
production PACS environment in order to characterize the enti-
ties, resources, processes and relationships. Figure 2 illustrates
the data model of the solution, representing the production en-
vironment. In the real world, a User belongs to a Facility in
an Organization. Subsequently, the Organization/Facility pro-
duces, stores or distributes Resources. Exemplifying, those Re-
sources may be medical equipment, DICOM objects or reports.
Moreover, the User shall have the possibility to access to each
Resource according with defined Permissions. To simplify the
attribution of Permission, it was decided to create the entity
Role that is responsible for aggregating Permissions of multi-
ple Users like, for instance, Administrative staff, Cardiologists,
Neurologists, etc. The creation of previously described entities
will allow the development of a platform with access control
functionalities. The authentication and authorization will only
be given by default to authorized personnel belonging to the
same organization which owns the requested resource. Addi-
tionally, authorization will only be given to personnel who have
the permission to perform the exact action (i.e. READ, WRITE,
CREATE). Furthermore, it is possible to share resources or per-
missions. A User that has access to a Resource and granted the
SHARE action permission, may share that Resource with other
users.
The proposed model is an abstraction of a real-work medical
imaging laboratory environment. However, it can be applied in
other situations. Figure 3 is shown the example of the usage of
the framework in an academic scenery. On top of the hierarchy
is the Organization. In this case, the organization shall be the
University. Bellow the hierarchic position of the organization,
the Schools of Computer Science and Health represent two of
the various Facilities the Organization can have. Belonging to
the schools, there is the Students A, B and C, the Professor and
the Resources 1, 2 and 3.
In the environment depicted in the Figure 3, the professor,
belonging to the University and owning the full right of access
to both the Schools, has the competency to give and revoke per-
missions to students. Focusing on Student A, he belongs to
both the Facilities School of Computer Science and School of
Health. If Student A is given permissions to READ resources,
he will be able to access the resources. However, Student B,
since she belongs only to the School of Computer Science, by
default, she just has access to Resource 1 from the School of
Computer Science. On the other hand, Student C can have ac-
cess, by default, to Resource 2 and 3. All of the permissions
are managed by the professor, the actor responsible for setting
the default definitions of the archive. I.e., the Professor, in this
environment, is responsible for setting if the students have per-
mission to all the resources of their environment or, contrarily,
revoking the access to, for instance, DICOM Objects of a spe-
cific Modality.
Furthermore, the framework open doors to restrict the access
to resources to some slots in the timetable. In the schema of the
Figure 3, for instance, the access permissions to the resources
by the Students A, B, and C could be restrained to only the
time of the class, revoking the access at the moment the class
finishes.
3.2. Architecture Overview
After defining the access control model, it was necessary
to implement it in a DICOM standard structured repository
for restricting resources access to authorized users, providing
mechanisms to manage entities, resources and roles. As ex-
pressed, our proposal was instantiated as an extension of Di-
coogle Open-Source PACS that already provides several fea-
tures to maintain a standard archive and for extraction of meta-
data associated with every DICOM object. The Dicoogle SDK
was used to develop and integrate the RBAC module with Di-
coogle core functionalities (Figure 4). Moreover, other Di-
coogle modules can also consume the new security services
provided by the RBAC module. The development of the de-
scribed accounting mechanism was particularly motivated by
the necessity of offering those security services to the DICOM
Web interface. In this context, Dicoogle WADO-RS, STOW-
RS and QIDO-RS services were re-factored to consume the
new RBAC module. The activation of this module was de-
fined as optional and managed by Dicoogle administrators. In
a Dicoogle instance with this RBAC option active, a third plat-
form will consume the Web Dicoogle services (storage, query
and retrieve) with the access to resources filtered by the RBAC
policies. In this case, the RBAC User is the one provided in
the HTTP authentication layer. Finally, a web portal was also
developed to support end-user management of proposed archi-
tecture. It consumes a new set of services available through a
Rest API, developed as well as a plugin. This new interface
allows managing Organizations, Facilities, Users, Permissions,
Resources, permission sharing and login/logout. The next sec-
tions will describe in detail the main developed modules and its
integration with Dicoogle services.
3.3. DBManager and Associated Services
Dicoogle open-source PACS already supports different users,
some with administrator privileges. However, the system does
not allow a different specification per user, like a READ or
WRITE permissions or restricted access to some modalities.
Moreover, the users are not integrated with Dicoogle DICOM
services for authentication and authorization purposes. To sup-
port the requirements of the new RBAC module, namely per-
missions granting or denial for reading or writing objects, it was
created an intermediate module to be included in the Dicoogle’s
architecture. As shown in Figure 4, a new DBManager module
was appended to the Dicoogle architecture and it is responsi-
ble for modeling the system entities along with DICOM data
model: Patient, Study, Series and Image. DBManager module
will be in strict communication with an external Database Man-
agement System (DBMS) responsible to store and index all the
permission granting to every object or device within healthcare
domain.
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Figure 3: Representation of the Role Based Access-Control model in the academic environment.
DBManager can be also integrated with healthcare informa-
tion system policies, for instance, through LDAP or HL7 proto-
cols. LDAP makes possible to centralize the user/role manage-
ment in a single place, for the convenience of IT departments.
For instance, it may be configured to fetch the user’s profiles
and configure the mapping to a specific authorization role. For
the patient and its data management, the HL7 manager module
plays a significant role because it allows to define specific trig-
ger actions to update the patient data when they are inserted into
database, keeping this way the consistent of data across differ-
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Figure 4: Proposed architecture - Dicoogle Integration
ent systems. Moreover, if the patient data is updated, the system
allows to receive message for update/merge information.
Finally, DICOM web modules communicate continuously
with DBManager for checking the identity and permissions of
every service requester.
In order to provide an interface for external developers, it
was developed a set of services for interaction with the DBMS
through DBManager, made available through a REST API. All
the services were developed as a Dicoogle plugin (Jetty ser-
vice plugin) and the main goal was to have access to the ba-
sic CRUD functions of the proposed access control mechanism
system. Those services must be protected against unauthorized
accesses. To do so, a filtering strategy was used (Figure 5), a
protecting barrier between the operation requester and the op-
eration itself. Once the reception of the request takes place,
the filter checks which permissions are needed to perform the
requested operation.
The requests have an HTTP header with attribute “Authoriza-
tion” that will contain the Dicoogle session token, represented
by an alphanumeric string of characters. A connection to Di-
coogle’s core is made to get data about the token such as the
user that is logged in. Since there are distinct accounting sys-
tems, it is required to verify, first of all, if the user is a member
of the access control system. Next, the system will check if
the user’s roles grant permission to perform the requested op-
eration, including the case where the permission is shared by
another user. After executing the authentication and authoriza-
tion process, three results are possible: 1) user is authorized
to perform the request and the normal service flow is started;
2) user is not authorization to perform the operation and a 403
(Forbidden) HTTP error message is returned; 3) user is access-
ing to an invalid service and a 400 (Bad Request) HTTP error
message is returned.
3.4. DICOM Web with RBAC
Some changes were introduced to the Dicoogle implementa-
tion of DICOMWeb standard to support the developed RBAC
mechanism. As described in the last section, the HTTP service
request must contain the “Authorization” attribute in the header
to make use of proposed system. If not provided, the system
may only provide access to public resources or simply deny the
service. Therefore, using the DBManager module, the system
will perform the validation of the authorization. Figure 6 il-
lustrates the sequence diagram of WADO-RS service, since the
Dicoogle user login until the DICOM object retrieval. On step
1, the user provides the username and password to Dicoogle
platform, that returns the access token if the authentication is
valid (step 2). Once the client application has the token, the
WADO-RS request (step 3) includes this token in the HTTP
header. This token is used by WADO-RS service to retrieve the
user information from Dicoogle core platform (steps 4 and 5).
Then, WADO-RS service establishes communication with the
DBManager module in order to check the user authorization to
resource access (steps 6 and 7). If the permission is granted,
the subsequent steps are the same as in a regular WADO-RS
service operation (steps 8 to 12). The grant is only provided if
the user has GET operation permission on the requested object
RESOURCE.
STOW-RS service logic is very similar to WADO-RS, where
the user also has to obtain a session token an make the request
with that session token in the Authorization header. However,
the permissions are slightly different, being necessary to have
operation permission “ADD” of a RESOURCE category.
Finally, QIDO-RS service implementation requested some
additional changes relative to the processes implemented in the
WADO-RS and STOW-RS cases (Figure 7)). Analogously to
the previous cases, the third-party client application shall per-
form the login in the Dicoogle PACS and get the session to-
ken to use the service. However, QIDO-RS plugin does not
check the permission rights of the user. The associated token
is broadcasted to all the index/query plugins of the Dicoogle
(in the current example of Figure 7, step 4). The task to check
the rights is performed by the index/query plugins that support
the accounting mechanism framework (step 5 to 7), once every
single index/query plugin needs to check if the user has permis-
sions. The query is then performed, and the results truncated to
include only the records that the requester has permissions to
LIST operation in RESOURCE category.
4. Validation
The user accounting mechanism introduces a delay on the
regular services execution, i.e. when compared with Dicoogle
without RBAC layer active. The impact is explained by the ad-
dition of additional processes like the need to verify, for each
HTTP request, the authorization clearance of the entity per-
forming the request. Concerning the validation of proposed sys-
tem, what is pertinent it to assess if the delay is not relevant (i.e.
acceptable) in the context of production environments. There-
fore, several tests were made to evaluate the performance im-
pact of the proposed solution. The methodology used simulates
the massive usage of Dicoogle DICOM Web services (STOW-
RS, QIDO-RS and WADO-RS), with and without RBAC mod-
ule active.
4.1. Assessment Procedure
The validation tests were carried out in a virtual machine run-
ning Linux (Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS). The virtual machine speci-
fications encompassed an Intel R© X R©(R) CPU E5-2630 v4 @
6
Path + Method + Parameters + Authorization Token Path + Method + Parameters
HTTP Error 400 or 403 if not found or not allowed
HTTP code 400 if invalid parameters or 200 with a response in the body
CheckPermission Filter 
- translates token to RBAC user object 
- gets list of permissions for the tuple Path, Method 
- checks if the user roles or permissions contains every required permissions
RBAC services
and
DICOMWeb services
Logged user 
with valid 
Authorization token 
Figure 5: Filter usage scheme
Dicoogle
Platform
WADO­RS
Plugin DBManager
Index/Query
Plugin
10:GetDicomObject(URI)
11:RetrieveDicomObject
Filestorage
Plugin 
Third Party
Application
6:CheckUser
Permission(User)
3:AccessDicomObject(token, uid)
4:GetUser(token)
5:User
7:Permission
Granted/Denied
8:GetURIFromIndexedObjects(uid)
9:URI
12:DicomObject
1:Login(username, password)
2:Authorization Token
Figure 6: Filter usage scheme for WADO-RS DICOM Web service
Dicoogle
Platform
QIDO­RS
Plugin DBManager
Index/Query
Plugin
Third Party
Application
1:Login(username, password)
2:Authorization Token
3:SearchDicomObject(token, query, requestedFields)
4:Search(query, fields,token)
10:QueryResultSet
7:CheckUser
Permission(User)
8:Permission
Granted/Denied9:QueryResultFields
5:GetUser(token)
6:User
Figure 7: Filter usage scheme for QIDO-RS DICOMWeb service
2.20GHz CPU with 4 cores available, memory of 4GB and
55GB of ROM memory.
In order to ensure maximum testing equality, some aspects
have been considered, such as:
• Same software version including operating system and
DBMS (MySQL 5.7.17);
• Same amount of memory;
• Same DICOM objects dataset;
• Same system load and number of active applications and
Number of files 2224 1120 960 417 368 352 156 78
Size (Kilobytes) 131 290 163 132 514 394 515 130
Table 1: File size of each DICOM file
services;
• Similar test replications, being the authorization and pro-
vision of the access token, the only factor changed.
The tests aim to validate the DICOM Web services (QIDO-
RS, WADO-RS and STOW-RS) robustness and performance
when using the RBAC module. So, tests were carried out in
the Dicoogle with and without authentication. The procedures
are identical, having only one change that is the addition of the
session token to each request with authentication active. Before
the service tests start, a request was made to the login service
in order to obtain the service access token. It was necessary
to create a test user with appropriated permissions, namely full
permissions to store DICOM objects (to test STOW-RS), ran-
domly generated permissions to query DICOM objects (to test
QIDO-RS) and randomly generated permissions to access DI-
COM objects (to test WADO-RS). This user was also associated
to one organization and 5 facilities.
In the case of QIDO-RS service, queries were built to try
each level of the DICOM Information Model: Patient, Study,
Series and Instance. The search parameters included sev-
eral attributes such as Modality, SOPInstanceUID, SeriesIn-
stanceUID, StudyInstanceUID and PatientID. The tests were
repeated 500 times.
Regarding the STOW-RS service, the storage of 5675 DI-
COM Objects was performed. The tests were repeated 5 times.
The distribution of the number of files per size is described in
Table 1.
To evaluate the WADO-RS case, 900 identifiers were used
for objects retrieve purposes. Using those identifiers, sequential
tests started to be performed, requesting the first frame of each
DICOM object in which all the files were in the permission list
of the testing user. The tests were repeated 4 times.
For the entire set of tests, the Unirest library was used since
it allows the invocation of REST services. The temporal dura-
tion of service, from the request creation until the request an-
swer, was recorded. Values such as Status code of the response,
name of the file to be stored (STOW-RS), query (QIDO-RS),
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STOW-RS QIDO-RS WADO-RS
Open access (ms) 36 21 42
Protected access (ms) 153 65 103
Table 2: Impact of the mechanism in the usual DICOM Web operations
SOPInstanceUID (WADO-RS), wait time and response body
were saved in a log file.
4.2. Evaluation Results
The results of the performed tests are shown in Table 2.
The table shows a comparison between the Dicoogle PACS DI-
COMWeb plugins with open access and with RBAC controlled
access. As expected, there was a growth in the services time of
execution: 4,25 times for STOW-RS; 3,10 times for QIDO-RS;
and 2,45 times for WADO-RS.
As explained before, the execution time increased due to the
additional logic and database operations to check the user per-
missions for a specific resource. Although the overhead of 117
ms, 44 ms and 61 ms in the cases of STOW-RS, QIDO-RS and
WADO-RS, respectively, the total running time presented in the
table is still very acceptable in a production environment. The
individual overhead in each case does not conduct to major loss
if there are more batch operations to run in the database, such
as the User belonging to 100 Facilities, for instance.
Particularly considering the STOW-RS plugin, each time a
request is made to store a DICOM object, it is necessary to cre-
ate the new resource in the database and define associated per-
missions. The permissions were created to the user that stored
the DICOM object but also to all the facilities he belongs. In
the test case, the user belongs to 5 facilities.
In the QIDO-RS case, the SQL query of the index/query plu-
gin had to contain additional restrictions to check the eligibility
of the user to retrieve the results. This means that the results
retrieved from the Database Management System are already
filtered.
Finally, the WADO-RS has the lowest delay. The reason for
this is explained for the lower number of permission checking
and database requests number.
5. Conclusion
Vendor neutral archive is a fundamental concept in modern
medical imaging environments since they use standard data for-
mat and interface [42, 43], making images accessible to health-
care professionals regardless of what proprietary system cre-
ated them. Traditional production environments have a server
archive instance per functional domain where every registered
client application has access to all studies. However, nowadays
usage paradigms of medical imaging resources are requesting
multi-repository archive server or, in other words, a service
accounting for DICOM standard archives. For instance, re-
gional repositories shared by distinct institutions, tele-radiology
as a service running in a Cloud provider, teaching and research
archives, are illustrative examples of this new reality.
The existing commercial PACS solutions usually provide ac-
counting mechanisms, but they do not match with the interop-
erability requirements, since these solutions implement propri-
etary interfaces that cannot not be consumed by a third-party
application through DICOM network services.
This article proposed a secure accounting mechanism for
medical imaging repositories that can be integrated with mod-
ern DICOM web services for storage, search and retrieve medi-
cal imaging data. The solution was instantiated as an extension
of Dicoogle open-source PACS. Besides providing accounting
services for standard services, it also includes Web services API
for integration with external applications and development of
new services in the future. The proposal validation was done
through a set of tests that demonstrated its robustness and us-
age feasibility in a production environment. The conclusion is
that the proposed system offers new security services with ac-
ceptable temporal costs.
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